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Assessing Customer Evaluation and Revenue Consequences of Component Sharing 
Across Brands in the Vertical Product Line  
 
Abstract 
Component sharing may look great in the boardroom, but not in the showroom. Indeed, savings on R&D 
and production costs could be offset by a plunge in customer brand attractiveness and willingness to pay. 
This paper investigates the impact of component sharing on customer evaluation of luxury, volume and 
economy brands offered in a car manufacturer’s vertical product line and its subsequent revenue 
consequences. The authors consider both the harm to the higher-end brand and the benefits for the lower-
end brand, and analyze with a random effects model how the size of these effects depends on the brand 
combination, the type of component, the source of the components sharing, and customer characteristics. 
An experimental study shows that the harm for the higher-end brand is largest, when (1) a luxury brand 
shares components with a volume brand, (2) the source of the components is the higher-end brand, and 
when (3) the customer has a high initial evaluation of the higher-end brand. For the lower-end brand, the 
positive effect is largest, when (1) a volume brand shares with an economy brand, (2) the lower-end brand 
is the source of the components, and (3) customers have a high initial evaluation of the higher-end brand. 
Components that have a strong impact on evaluation are interior, wheels, chassis and the engine. 
Simulations show that sharing components typically translates in negative revenue consequences for both 
analyzed manufacturers. An interesting exception emerges for the Japanese manufacturer, which obtains a 
boost in total revenue when its small luxury brand shares components with its large volume brand.  
 
Key-words: Component sharing, branding, interface marketing and production, customer evaluation, firm 
revenues 
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1. Introduction 
Firms in different industries have adopted product-based strategies seeking product designs that allow 
high variety in the market place while simplifying the production and distribution system with a relatively 
low level of component variety and assembly complexity (Fisher, Ramdas and Ulrich 1999). Component 
sharing is an example of such product-based strategy. In component sharing, families of products have 
similar components. Examples of component sharing can be found in many industries, including 
automobiles, computer hardware and consumer electronics (Desai, Kekre, Radhakrishnan and Srinivasan 
2001, Moore, Louviere and Verma 1999). The automotive industry is particularly known for its use of 
component sharing, as new products drive firm profitability and stock market value (Pauwels, Silva-
Risso, Srinivasan and Hanssens 2004), but are very costly to develop: from up to $100 million in the late 
1950s to up to $4 billion in recent years (Sherman and Hoffer 1971, White 2001). The advantages of 
component sharing are twofold: leveraging high R&D costs over multiple products and achieving 
production efficiencies. Recently however, car reviewers have criticized several manufacturers, including 
General Motors, for the use of component sharing (Desai et al. 2001, White 2004). Likewise, 
Volkswagens’ strategy of component sharing between brands in different price segments is believed to 
cannibalize sales of its higher priced brands (Edmonson 2003). Moreover, Ramdas and Randall (2004) 
recently showed that component sharing is not always an effective strategy for maximizing product 
quality. In today’s business press, the potential drawbacks of component sharing are a hotly debated issue 
(Business Week 2004) 
Two research streams have shed light on parts of the component sharing picture. First, the 
management science literature demonstrated the cost efficiency of component sharing practices in the 
automotive industry (Fisher et al. 1999). Using analytical models, Desai et al. (2001) and Krishnan and 
Gupta (2001) discuss the appropriateness of component sharing. Ramdas and Sawhney (2001) propose a 
methodology that can be used to determine the optimal number of line extensions sharing components by 
taking cost- and revenue implications into account. Recently, Ramdas and Randall (2004) investigate the 
impact of component sharing on product reliability. While these studies point to potential disadvantages 
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of component sharing, such as cannibalization and decreased product differentiation, they do not directly 
examine consumer perceptions and evaluation of component sharing. 
Second, the branding literature has investigated how brand- and line extensions and ingredient 
branding impact consumer brand evaluations (e.g. Desai and Keller 2002, Loken and John 1993, Park, 
Jun and Shocker 1996, Simonin and Ruth 1998). In general, these studies show that such branding 
practices can have both positive and negative effects on brand evaluations depending on the execution of 
the branding strategy. However, the practice of component sharing has yet to receive scientific analysis 
from a branding perspective. 
From a managerial point of view, the impact of component sharing on brand evaluation is becoming 
an important question. Usually, firms are reluctant to share information on component sharing practices 
with the market, as they fear consumer backslash. However, as component sharing has become common 
practice in many industries, consumers have start noticing. Even general newspapers nowadays publish 
articles on component sharing, both in the US (e.g. Financial Times 2004) as in Europe (e.g. De Tijd 
2004). Finally, over 60% of new vehicle buyers researched their purchase on the Internet, where they can 
easily compare product specifications and consumer comments (Jupiter Research 2003). For all these 
reasons, manufacturers cannot simply trust that their component sharing practices will remain a secret for 
all but the savviest consumers. Business Week (2004) recently made this point clear: “While sharing the 
basic structure of a car or truck can generate huge savings for most models, Ford discovered that it just 
won’t wash in the luxury market. Most car buyers have no idea what a platform even is. But word quickly 
gets around when a new model shares its undercarriage with more plebeian cars. And it turns out that 
someone paying $40.000 for the luxury cachet of his first Jaguar cares a great deal that car’s guts are 
being shared with something that may cost only $20.000 or so”  (p. 72-73). However, the popular press 
lacks a systematic investigation of both negative and the positive evaluation effects of component sharing 
for a manufacturer’s brand portfolio. Indeed, sharing the “car’s guts” with Jaguar may increase evaluation 
of the Ford car priced at “only $20,000 or so”. In this context, the high-end component may function as an 
ingredient that improves the reputation of the brand at the low end of the market (Park, Jun and Shocker 
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1996). Indeed, component sharing “sometimes means mass-market consumers get engineering that was 
originally intended for the luxury crowd” (White 2004).  
As a result, we postulate that component-sharing practices impact customer evaluations for both 
sharing brands, which impact subsequent purchase behavior and prices paid for the car. However, this 
impact might be different for different customer sharing strategies and brand combinations. In this paper, 
we develop a conceptual model that assesses the impact of different component sharing strategies on 
customers’ brand evaluations and their subsequent impact on purchase behavior and prices. Based on this 
model, firms can assess the revenue consequences of component between brands in the vertical product 
line. Firms should subsequently decide whether the cost reductions achieved with component sharing 
outweigh possible negative revenue consequences.   
The outline of this paper is as follows. First, we elaborate on how component sharing differs from 
other branding strategies such as brand extensions and ingredient branding. Next, we discuss relevant 
theory and formulate our hypotheses. Section 4 details our methodology, while section 5 reports the 
findings. We conclude with managerial implications, study limitations and avenues for further research.  
  
2. Component sharing and branding strategies 
A firm’s product line or portfolio can be characterized by its horizontal and vertical structure. The 
horizontal structure refers to the firms’ activities in different product categories. For instance, the rich 
research stream on brand extensions has focused on this horizontal structure by studying spillover- and 
feedback effects of brand extensions (e.g. Keller and Aaker 1992). Researchers have also considered the 
vertical nature of product lines (Randall, Ulrich and Reibstein 1998); the focus of our study. 
In today’s markets, firms offer different brands along the vertical product line with three general 
positioning strategies: 1) luxury (prestige, premium) brands, 2) volume (mass-market) brands, and 3) 
economy (price) brands. For instance, Volkswagen AG offers Audi (luxury), Volkswagen (volume) and 
Skoda (economy) in the car market. Originally, brands were designed and manufactured in isolation. To 
achieve manufacturing economies of scale, firms started to share components among the offered brands 
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(Fisher, Ramdas and Ulrich 1999). Nowadays, luxury brands may share components with volume brands, 
and volume brands may share components with economy brands. As a result, brands along the vertical 
product line may have similar product attributes. 
 To some extent, the component sharing issue seems to be closely related to ingredient branding (Park 
et al. 1996, Simonin and Ruth 1998, Venkatesh and Mahajan 1997). In ingredient branding, a brand (e.g. 
Compaq or Godiva) explicitly communicates that one single attribute from the product is from a specific 
manufacturer (e.g. Intel or Slim Fast). Component sharing differs from ingredient branding in three 
important ways. First, ingredient branding concerns two different brands operating in different product 
categories (i.e. computers and chips or washing powder and soap). Usually, the host branded product 
consists of many ingredients or components of which one ingredient is branded by a supplier from outside 
the product category. In the case of component sharing, one or more attributes are shared with a brand in 
the same product category. Second, brands sharing components usually do not actively communicate this 
in the market. In contrast, ingredient branding is a very explicit strategy in which brands actively 
communicate the inclusion of the branded ingredient in the product. For instance, Chrysler advertises the 
‘Hemi’ engine in its top-line Dodge models (Wall Street Journal 2004). Third, the motives underlying 
ingredient branding and component sharing are different. Firms apply ingredient branding to enhance 
brand value while component sharing is applied to gain economies of scale. Still, explicit measurement of 
the effects of component sharing on brand pricing power is crucial, as customer revenue implications may 
far outweigh any cost efficiency gains (Goshn 2004).  
 
3. A revenue model framework for component sharing 
Figure 1 displays our framework to assess the revenue consequences of component sharing. Its main 
research contribution is that we allow changes to customer evaluation for both involved brands. Its key 
managerial message is that component sharing may impact market revenues through its trade-off effects 
on purchase intentions and willingness-to-pay for both the higher-end and the lower-end brands.  
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These revenue consequences may however differ between customer sharing strategies, depending on  
1) the positioning of the component sharing brands (luxury-volume versus volume-economy 
combination), 2) the identified source of the component, and 3) the component type being shared. We 
discuss these factors below.  
-- Insert Figure 1 about here -- 
3.1 Effect of Component Sharing on Brand Evaluations 
The general expectation underlying our model is that component sharing across brands in the vertical 
product line will negatively affect brand evaluations of the higher-end brand and will have positive 
consequences for evaluations of the lower-end brand. Several behavioral theories support this assumption. 
The branding literature suggests that brands can be understood in terms of a set of attributes, each at 
particular performance levels (Keller 1998). As components are shared, some attributes of the sharing 
brands become more alike. Hence, the differentiation between sharing brands decreases (Desai et al. 
2001), especially if this differentiation is based on attributes that can be traced back to the shared 
components. Likewise, the economic value of a product to the customer consists of the reference value 
and the differentiation value (Nagle and Holden 1995). Lower brand differentiation decreases the brands’ 
uniqueness, which subsequently may decrease customer value of higher-end brands. Moreover, consumer 
research suggests that price differences across brands are frequently interpreted in terms of quality 
differences (Bolton, Warlop and Alba 2003). When components are shared, the perceived quality 
differences between brands shrink. Consequently, consumers may question the fairness of the price 
difference between a higher-end and a lower-end brand, resulting in lower brand evaluations for the 
higher-end brand. As for the lower-end brands, the above arguments imply that component sharing may 
increase their evaluation. Indeed, these lower-end brands may also start sharing higher-end brand 
associations (Janiszewski and Van Osselaer 2000, Keller 1998). Specifically, the use of a higher-end 
brand component in a lower priced brand may signal a higher quality for that brand. As a consequence, its 
customer evaluation will increase (Desai and Keller 2002, Rao, Lu and Ruekert 1999).  
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3.2 Impact of Brand Combination 
First, we expect that the effect of component sharing on changes in brand evaluation depends on the 
positioning of the higher-end and lower-end brands. Luxury brands or prestige brands are positioned in 
the premium high end of the market. Economic theory suggests that consumers buy such brands in order 
to advertise their wealth, thereby achieving greater social status, which is known as the Veblen effect 
(Bagwell and Bernheim 1996, Braun and Wicklund 1989). Likewise, the branding literature suggests that 
these brands are purchased for exclusivity and communication of status (Kirmani, Sood and Bridges 
1999, Park, Milberg and Lawson 1991). The brands status is, amongst others, based on the customers’ 
assumption that these brands are unique; i.e. have their own distinctive unique characteristics. If such 
brands now share components with lower-positioned brands, their uniqueness would become tainted and 
the social status of owning them would severely diminish. The negative effect of component sharing with 
a lower-end brand might be less strong for volume brands, as brand uniqueness is not such an important 
issue for a volume brand, sharing components with a lower-end brand might therefore not severely impact 
its attractiveness.  
From the perspective of the lower-end brand, the customer evaluation benefits from component 
sharing may also depend on the positioning of the higher-end brand. Indeed, components shared with a 
luxury brand may transfer quality and prestige to the lower-end brand (Simonin and Ruth 1998). The 
effect should also depend on the positioning of the lower-end brand. Brands that are already associated 
with having good quality components will benefit less from sharing components with higher-end brands. 
To control for the effect of the consumers’ perceived brand evaluation of both the high-end, and 
lower-end brand, we also include the initial evaluation of these brands as determinants of changes in 
brand evaluation. Thereby, we expect that the initial evaluation of the high-end brand will positively 
impact the positive change in evaluation of the low-end brand, while it will negatively impact the change 
in evaluation of the high-end brand. For the initial evaluation of the low-end brand, we expect that the 
positive change of the low-end brand will be smaller if consumers already have a high initial evaluation 
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of the low-end brand. The negative change in evaluation of the high-end brand will be smaller if 
consumers already have a high initial evaluation of the low-end brand. 
 
3.3 Source of Component sharing 
In our study, we consider three sourcing formats: (1) the higher-end brand shares (sends) a 
component brand with (to) the lower-end brand, (2) the higher-end brand and lower-end brand share the 
same component, and (3) the lower-end brand shares (sends) a component with (to) the higher-end brand. 
Note, that the ‘objective’ end result is identical across the sourcing strategies: two brands have the same 
component. Why then would the source of component sharing impact customer evaluation? Research on 
judgment and decision-making has shown that framing messages differently affects the evaluation of 
these messages (Levin and Geath 1987, Shiv, Edell and Payne 1997, Thaler 1985, Tversky and 
Kahneman 1981). In our context, sourcing format 1 communicates that the higher-end brand sends its 
component to a lower positioned brand. Such message should mainly transfer consumer associations from 
the more prestigious higher-end brand to the lower-end brand, but limit the (negative) transfer from the 
lower-end to the higher-end brand. Sourcing format 2 is more neutral and only communicates that the two 
brands have the same component without mentioning its original source. Sourcing format 3 is most 
negatively framed for the higher-end brand, as consumers may believe that lower-end brand components 
are inferior. As a result, format 3 should create severe negative effects on the higher-end brand’s 
evaluation. Anecdotic evidence for this is provided by practices of Ford, where the prestige brand Jaguar 
is referred to as an upgraded Ford Mondeo, because it receives components from this Ford sub-brand.  
Interestingly, it is unclear which sourcing format is better or worse for the lower-end brand. On the 
one hand, ingredient-branding literature would suggest that imputing a component from a higher-end 
brand with a higher quality reputation should have the most positive consequences for the lower-end 
brand (e.g. Park et al. 1996). On the other hand, identifying the lower-end brand as the source may 
communicate to consumers that the component quality of this brand is apparently so good, that a higher-
end brand is using the same component. 
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3.4 Impact of Component Type 
Both theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that the impact of component sharing on brand 
evaluations depends on the component type being shared. Importantly, components differ on at least two 
dimensions: importance and visibility. As for the former, Fisher et al. (1999) distinguish between 
components with a strong influence on product quality, such as the car engine, versus components with a 
weak influence on product quality, such as car brakes. Researchers and car manufacturers typically 
assume that components with a weak influence can easily be shared without having any negative 
repercussions (Yasukawa 1992). In the same vein, Desai et al. (2001) report that the importance of the 
component determines whether component sharing is appropriate. Finally, research on product 
categorization and product attributes suggests that essential attributes are highly influential for an 
understanding of the concept of the car (Eysenck and Keane 1990).  
As to the latter, manufacturers have learnt the hard way that visible differences are key to maintaining 
a brand image (Financial Times 2004). For example, Bentley was embarrassed to hand over its first $ 
200K Continental GTs with the same cheap black plastic key used for the $ 22K Volkswagen Golf. In 
general, while many components related to the intrinsic quality of a car are not directly visible to 
consumers (e.g. car platform and brakes), others (e.g. the interior) make up the visual elements 
contributing to the ‘extrinsic quality’. This extrinsic quality of a product is crucial to its market success 
(Bloch 1995, Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987). As visible components are shared, the similarity of brands 
becomes more salient to consumers. Hence, we expect that the perceived differentiation between car 
brands will decrease more strongly when visible components are shared.  
 
4. Research Design and Analysis 
We empirically test our model in an experiment. Using this experiment we vary brand combinations, 
sourcing strategies, and the shared components. Appendix 1 details the pretest results, and the 
experimental procedures and measures, which we summarize below. 
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4.1. Choice of brands and components 
Based on pre-tests (see Appendix 1), we choose two sets of real brands:  (1) Audi, Volkswagen and 
Skoda (A/V/S), and (2) Lexus, Toyota and Suzuki (L/T/S) as respectively the luxury, volume and 
economy brands. Our motivation for selecting these brand sets is threefold: (1) they are widely known in 
the respondent population, (2) they differ in terms of top-line contribution by luxury versus economy 
brands4, and (3) they cover Western brands, which are often criticized for an over-reliance on component 
sharing, and Japanese brands, which are reluctant to compromise ‘product uniqueness’ (Ykusawa 1992, 
Fisher, Ramdas and Ulrich 1999). Moreover, we select components that vary in terms of importance and 
visibility. The eight selected components, shown in table 1, substantially differ on these dimensions. 
-- Insert Table 1 about here -- 
4.2 Data collection 
We collect our data by means of an Internet questionnaire to the panel of a Dutch market research 
agency. The selected respondents are 20-65 years old, and usually purchase new cars (not second-hand 
cars) in the full-size car market. This selection yields 179 respondents, of which 34 did not fully complete 
the questionnaire. The resulting sample size of 145 respondents includes 67 respondents for A/V/S, and 
78 respondents for L/T/S. The average age is 43 years, approximately 75% is male, 88% earned an 
education of high school or higher, and 63% of respondents have an above average income. The relative 
high education and high income of our respondents is probably due to our focus on new large car buyers. 
 
4.3 Design and measures 
First, respondents are assigned to one of the two brand sets. For each brand set, the study design is a 2 
(Brand Combination) x 3 (Source Format) between-subjects factorial design, combined with a within-
subjects design for the 8 shared component types. Each respondent is randomly assigned to one of the six 
conditions.  
                                                 
4 In 2004 sales, Dutch sales for Audi, VW and Skoda reached respectively 11,313; 42,480 and 6,286. The numbers 
for Lexus, Toyota and Suzuki are respectively 569; 29,286 and 11,619. 
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We started the questionnaire with some questions on car, and brand ownership. Next, we presented 
the respondents with pictures of the brands in the brand set (see Appendix A.2). Subsequently, each 
respondent was asked to evaluate the brand attractiveness on a 1-100 (1=absolutely unattractive, 100 
=absolutely very attractive) scale, the maximum price in Euros they are willing to pay for that brand and 
their purchase intentions for the brand on a 0-10 scale (0=absolutely not planning to buy, 10=absolutely 
planning to buy). The average score on the initial brand questions are provided in Table 2. In line with our 
brand classification, pairwise t-tests show significant differences in the brand evaluations and average 
willingness to pay between all considered brands in the brand set (p<0.01).   
Next, we described to the respondent, that the manufacturer is planning to share components between 
two brands. The description differed for the three source component conditions (see Table 3). One by one, 
we confronted the respondents with 8 components being shared. These components were randomly 
presented to the respondents to overcome any order effects. For each component, the respondent was 
asked to evaluate the attractiveness of the higher-end brand and the lower-end brand on a 1-100 scale.  
We ended the questionnaire with straightforward questions on income, education, age, and gender.  
-- Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here -- 
4.4 Analysis  
The analysis of our model framework (Figure 1) involves two stages. In the first stage, we estimate 
the effect of sharing strategies on change in customer evaluation. In the second stage, we estimate the 
effect of evaluations on both purchase intentions and willingness to pay. 
The dependent variable in the first stage is the change in customer evaluation of customer i of the 
higher-end (he) and the lower-end brand (le) due to component sharing strategies (s), given by: 
∆EVAi,he,s =EVAi,he – EVAi,he,s        (1) 
∆EVAi,le,s =EVAi,le – EVAi,le,s        (2) 
As each respondent is confronted with 8 component types being shared, we have 8 observations per 
respondent. Hence, our data can be considered as panel data. To account for the interdependency between 
these 8 observations, we estimate a random effects model (Greene 2002, Train 2003), assuming the 
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random effect (ui) for respondent i is the same for each shared component. We include dummies for the 
experimentally manipulated conditions. For the brand combination, we include the dummy LUXVOL 
(Luxury-Volume), leaving the Volume –Economy combination as the base case. For the component 
source, we include HILOW (Higher End to Lower End) and LOWHI (Lower End to Higher End), leaving 
HI&LOW (no identified source) as the base scenario. A dummy BS is included to control for the brand 
set (0=L/T/S,1=A/V/S). We include a vector of 7 dummies COMP for 7 of the shared components, using 
wipers as the benchmark (this component was considered least important in our pre-tests). Initial 
evaluations of the higher end and lower end brands are included as EVAi,he and EVAi,le. Finally, we aim to 
control for observed consumer heterogeneity by a set of variables (denoted as X), including dummies for 
the ownership of the three considered brands in our brand sets, age, income, education and car expertise 
(how long the respondent has owned a car). The resulting random effects regression models are given by: 
∆EVAi,he = β0+β1,heLUXVOLi+β2,he HILOWi+β3he LOWHIi+ β4,heBSi 
+ γ,he COMPik+ δ1,he EVAi,he+ δ2,he EVAi,le + λhe Xi+ εik,he +ui,he   (3) 
∆EVAi,le = β0+β1,leLUXVOLi+β2,le HILOWi+β3,le LOWHIi+ β4,leBSi  
+γ,le COMPik+ δ1,le EVAi,le+ δ2,le EVAi,le +λle Xi+ εik,le +ui,he   (4) 
with εik the unique random term for respondent i, and component k, and ui is the respondent-specific term. 
Both εik and ui are bivariate normal distributed with means (0,0), variances σ2 and ϖ2 , correlation 0, and 
also assumed uncorrelated across individuals. The models are estimated in LIMDEP 8.0 (Greene 2002). 
In the second stage of the analysis, we use seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to estimate the 
effect of the evaluations on purchase intentions (PI) and willingness to pay (WTP) per brand (b). SUR 
accounts for the fact that the errors of the equations for PI and WTP might be correlated. In our model, we 
account for customer-specific effects (Z): ownership of brand, age, income, education, and car expertise 
(how long the respondent has owned a car). The model specification is: 
PIi,b      =  α0,p + α1,p*EVAi,b, + θp*Zi + εi,b,p        (5)  
WTPi,b =  α0,w + α1,w*EVAi,b, + θw*Zi + εi,b,w 
  13
We estimate these models per brand, because the effect of EVA on PI, and WTP might differ between 
brands. For instance, while consumers might highly value Audi, its high price may limit purchase intent.  
 
5. Findings 
5.1 Descriptive Results  
Before presenting our estimation results, we briefly discuss the descriptive findings in Table 4. For 
the total sample, we find that component sharing on average decreases the evaluation for the high-end 
brand by 6.23 (standard deviation = 15.26), while it increases evaluation for the low-end brand by 2.61 
(s.d. =14.87). Both values significantly differ from 0 (p<0.01), and are in line with our expectations for 
both sets of brands. Interestingly, the absolute change for the high-end brand is significantly larger than 
the absolute change for the low-end brand (p<0.01). We find significant differences between the two 
brand-sets. The average deviation is significantly larger for L/T/S, than for A/V/S. This difference is 
consistent with the alleged lower component sharing by Japanese brands (Fisher et al. 1999), and 
reflected in the larger price differences between them.  
Our results show significant differences in changes in evaluations between the brand combinations 
(p<0.01) and the source of the components (p<0.01) for both the high-end and the low-end brand. We 
particularly find that the luxury-volume combination yields the highest change in evaluation. 
Interestingly, we also find that the lower-end brand’s evaluation gets a higher boost when it is identified 
as the source of component sharing.  
-- Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here -- 
5.2 Model Results Evaluation 
Change in Evaluation for the High End brand 
Estimation results of equations (4) with random effects are displayed in the first two columns of 
Table 5. For interpretation of the coefficients, it is important to note that a negative coefficient implies a 
larger negative change in evaluation of the high-end brand.  
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First, we find that the change in evaluation depends on the type of brand combination, as we find a 
negative significant effect of LUXVOL (p<0.01). Thus, if a luxury brand shares components with a 
volume brand, the negative change in evaluation is larger than when the volume brand shares components 
with an economy brand. This supports the notion that the luxury brand has a special status/prestige, which 
is more affected by sharing than the evaluation of brands in the lower ends of the spectrum. Note also, 
that we find a significant negative effect of the initial evaluation of the high-end brand (EVAhe) (p<0.01). 
High-end brands with strong initial evaluation suffer a larger decrease in customer evaluation when 
sharing components. The opposite occurs for the initial evaluation of the low-end brand (EVAle): 
component sharing with a better-evaluated low-end brand is less harmful for the high-end brand (p<0.01).  
Second, the identified source of component sharing does significantly affect the evaluation changes. 
In line with expectations, we find that the largest negative change occurs when the lower-end brand is 
named as the component source (LOWHI) (p<0.01). The smallest change occurs when naming the high-
end brand as the source (HILOW) (p<0.01). Our results also show that the negative change in evaluation 
is significantly larger for L/T/S than for A/V/S (p<0.01).  
With respect to the components, we find that sharing the interior (p<0.01), wheels (p<0.05) and the 
chassis (p<0.05) have a significant larger negative impact than sharing the wiper component. The effects 
of sharing the other components do not significantly differ from sharing the wiper component.  
Finally, we find significant effects of our included consumer characteristics. We particularly highlight 
the effect of owning one of the shared brands. We find that owners of the luxury and volume brands have 
larger negative change in evaluation than non-owners (p<0.01), while the opposite occurs for economy 
brand owners. This finding is consistent with the notion that owners of luxury and volume brands care 
more about maintaining their brand status and uniqueness (Kirmani, Sood and Bridges 1999). 
 
Change in Evaluation for the Low End Brand 
For interpretation of the coefficients in the last column of Table , note that a positive coefficient 
implies a larger positive change in evaluation of the lower-end brand. 
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First, our findings for brand combination mirror those for the evaluation change in the high-end 
brand. The change in evaluation of the volume brand when sharing components with the luxury brand is 
smaller than the change in evaluation of the volume brand sharing with the economy brand (p < 0.01). 
Managerially, the negative consequences for the luxury brand are relatively large, while the benefits for 
the volume brands are relatively small. For the volume-economy combination, the opposite holds: the 
economy brand evaluation benefits are higher than the evaluation harm for the volume brand. 
Second, the initial evaluation of the two brands also affects the change in evaluation of the low-end 
brand. Particularly, we find that the change is larger when the high-end brand has a high initial evaluation 
(EVALhe) (p < 0.01), while it is lower when the low-end brand has a high initial evaluation (EVALle) (p 
<0.01). Thus, low-end brands that are already evaluated favorably by consumers do not benefit much 
from sharing components with high-end brands. 
Our results also show that the change in evaluation depends on the source of the component. We find 
that the largest change occurs when the low-end brand functions as a source (LOWHI) of the shared 
components (p <0.01). In other words, consumers apparently conclude that the lower-end brand must 
have really good quality components, for them to be used in a higher-end brand. Interestingly, the 
smallest evaluation increase occurs when the high-end brand is named as a source (HILOW) (p <0.01). 
This finding is surprising, as the ingredient branding literature would suggest that specifying the higher-
end brand as the source should yield the largest evaluation increase for the lower-end brand. Together 
with our finding for the higher-end brand evaluation, this result suggest that no framing format is 
dominated by others from the manager’s perspective: the sourcing formats that yield higher benefits to the 
lower-end brand, cause more harm to the evaluation of the higher-end brand.  
With respects to the components, the car engine is the sole component that has significantly larger 
positive effect on the receiving brand (p <0.05). We also find significant effects of our included consumer 
characteristics. The evaluation change is larger when the consumer owns the volume brand (p <0.01) or 
the economy brand (p <0.01). It is smaller when the consumer owns a luxury brand (p <0.01). 
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5.3 Purchase Intent and Willingness To Pay Models 
In table 6, we report the estimation results of equation (5) using Seemingly Unrelated Regression. As 
many variables failed to reach effects with p-values below 0.20, we deleted these variables to achieve a 
more parsimonious model. The R2 varies between 0.19 and 0.420 for the intention models, and between 
0.14 and 0.39 for the price (WTP) models. As expected, we find a significant positive effect of brand 
evaluations on purchase intentions and willingness to pay in all cases. The size of these effects varies 
between brand types. We also find some significant effects of the included consumer characteristics.  
- Insert Table 6 about here – 
6. Assessing Revenue Effects 
To assess the revenue consequences of the component sharing strategies, we have to make some 
assumptions by: (1) setting the expected base quantity to the 2004 sales of the cars on the Dutch market, 
and (2) using the average measure of consumer characteristics across all respondents, as a proxy for 
actual potential buyers. Most importantly, we acknowledge that our self-report results may overestimate 
actual consumer decisions, as marketing literature has established that intentions are powerful, but 
imperfect predictors of future purchase behavior (Morwitz and Schmittlein 1992). For automobile 
purchases, the authors found that only about 30% of the respondents who intended to buy a car in the next 
0-6 months actually did so (ibid). While this finding does not necessarily translate into intention changes 
due to component sharing, we believe it serves as a useful benchmark for our revenue impact simulation. 
Therefore, we perform our calculation assuming that market actions by (potential) customers will only 
partially translate into actions, by weighting intention and willingness-to-pay changes by a factor of 0.3. 
Evidently, the latter calculation can also be used by managers to incorporate the phenomenon that only a 
subsection of potential customers learn about component sharing before making their purchase decision. 
For illustration purposes, we perform our revenue impact calculation for four components, one from 
each cell of table 1: interior, wipers, engine and platform/chassis. Following our model in Figure 1, we 
first calculate the impact of component sharing on the customer evaluation of each brand, using the 
estimates of table 5.  Next, we translate this evaluation change to percentage effects on purchase intention 
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and willingness to pay, using the estimates in table 6. In absolute values, changes to purchase intention 
are in the [.17%, 16.31%] range, while changes to willingness to pay are in the [.03%, 4.44%] range. As 
none of these values appeared unreasonable to car industry analysts, we proceed with computing the 
revenue consequences by multiplying the actual 2004 market sales and prices with our % changes, 
weighting the intention and willingness to pay findings by 0.3. Tables 7-9 summarize the results for each 
of the three sourcing formats.  
- Insert Tables 7, 8 and 9 about here - 
Overall, component sharing has the expected negative impact on revenues, which should then be 
compared to anticipated cost savings to guide decision making. For the German manufacturer, the 
revenue decline ranges from 0.53% to 4.25% of the total revenue of the involved brands. For the Japanese 
manufacturer, we in general find revenue drops in a lower range: from .01% to 2.98%. In other words, 
brands matter: Toyota Motor Corporation appears to suffer less than Volkswagen AG in terms of revenue 
consequences from component sharing. Interestingly, we even find a positive revenue impact for Lexus 
sharing with Toyota, especially for important components (engine and platform/chassis) and when Toyota 
is identified as the source. A priori, two reasons may explain this result. First, Lexus’ brand status may 
not decrease much (perhaps even increase) as a result of sharing components with Toyota, as Toyota cars 
have a strong reputation for quality and reliability. Our findings do not support this explanation, as 
purchase intentions for Lexus do drop by 7%-15%, and willingness to pay by 1%-5% as a result of 
component sharing. Instead, our calculations support a second explanation: Toyota sales dwarf Lexus 
sales in the Netherlands, so that any benefit to Toyota is weighted much more than any harm to Lexus. In 
this case, company revenues may actually benefit from spreading the word on component sharing 
between the major volume brand and a very small luxury brand. Evidently, such behavior may conflict 
with long-term objectives, such as building the luxury brand.  
As expected, the type of shared component matters: sharing an important and visible component such 
as the car’s interior typically generates the strongest revenue loss. However, revenue consequences are 
not that much lower for components that rate low on importance and/or visibility. To the extent that these 
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findings are reflected in the market place (see acknowledged limitations below), our results suggest that 
manufacturers should carefully consider customer evaluation for any type of component sharing. 
Finally, the component source matters, which is good news to manufacturers that can exercise some 
control over this issue. For luxury brands sharing with volume brands, it appears best to identify the 
lower-end brand as the source. For volume brands sharing with economy brands, it again pays to identify 
the volume brand as the source. In other words, a general guideline emerges: identify the volume brand as 
the component source. The generalizability of this guideline is strongly tied to the large relative 
contribution of the volume brand to the manufacturer’s top line. Indeed, the volume brand represents 77% 
of revenues for both analyzed brand combinations.  
 
7. Conclusions and Avenues for Future Research 
This paper analyzed the revenue consequences of component sharing by considering customer 
evaluation changes for both the higher-end brand and the lower-end brand. First, consistent with 
anecdotal evidence (Business Week 2004), we find that component sharing harms customer evaluation of 
the higher-end brand. The size of this negative effect, however, depends on the component source and on 
the type of component shared. It is largest for the car’s interior, which is both important and visible to 
consumers. It also becomes larger when the lower-end brand is the source of the component. In this case, 
negative associations of the lower-end brand may be transferred to the higher-end brand.  
For the lower-end brand, the positive impact of component sharing also depends on the analyzed 
conditions. First, the economy brand seems to benefit most from component sharing. This brand has the 
lowest perceived quality and status, and it does not take much to improve its evaluation. In contrast, the 
volume brand already has a sound reputation with respect to most of the components. Second, identifying 
the lower-end brand as the source of the shared component helps. This appears counterintuitive, as one 
would expect that a component from the higher-end brand might function as a kind of ingredient for the 
lower-end brand. One explanation for this finding is that consumers will perceive that components of the 
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lower-end brand are apparently so good, that they are shared with the higher-end brand, which boosts the 
evaluation of the lower-end brand. Further research is needed to validate this explanation. 
We also assessed the revenue impact of component sharing strategies. In general, component sharing 
will have negative revenue effects, because the negative change in evaluation of the higher-end brand is 
much larger than the positive evaluation change for the lower-end brand. Therefore, manufacturers should 
be very careful when implementing component sharing. However, our simulations imply positive revenue 
effects when small (niche) luxury brands share components with very large volume brands. In the short 
run, component sharing may thus improve both revenues and costs. In the long-run though, these positive 
changes might be offset by large negative effects on the perceived prestige of luxury brands.  
The current study has several limitations, including the choice of country and respondent sample, the 
focus on only six brands, and the use of stated (self-reported) impact instead of actual sales data. 
Moreover, we focused on the customer side of component sharing; which received little previous study. 
Other parts of the profitability equation are needed to balance the revenue and cost drivers. For instance, 
we could not obtain precise information on the component cost-coefficient (Desai et al 2001) for a 
representative group of manufacturers (such information is highly confidential and likely differs per firm). 
Future research can also use a between-subjects design to assess the differences between components, and 
study boundary conditions, such as timing of sharing (i.e., immediately or after 1 year). One particular 
interesting avenue for further research is to directly analyze the sales impact of component sharing 
announcements and articles.  
Despite these limitations, the current study provides several key insights which are relevant to the 
decision on and the execution of component sharing. As consumers are becoming more knowledgeable 
about component sharing practices, managers should aim for solutions that look good in the boardroom 
and in the showroom. 
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Appendix: Pretest, and experimental procedures and measures 
A1. Pretests 
We selected a European brand combination Audi, Volkswagen and Skoda, and a Japanese brand 
combination Lexus, Toyota and Suzuki. Within these brands, we choose cars of the same size: Audi A4 
Sedan, Volkswagen Passat Sedan and the Skoda SuperB Sedan; and Lexus IS 2000, Toyota Corolla 
Verso, and Suzuki Lilian. The dealer prices of the considered brands for Audi, VW and Skoda are 
respectively 33.000 Euro, 29.500 Euro, and 26.000 Euro.  For Lexus, Toyota and Suzuki these prices are 
respectively 34.000 Euro, 26.000 Euro, and 17.000 Euro. In order to enhance external validity, we also 
provided typical information (identical across cars) on motor, gear and steering specifications. Some 
validity for our classification is provided in a separate pre-study, where we asked 50 consumers to 
evaluate the brands in terms of perceived price level, perceived prestige level and perceived quality on a 
10-point scale. The average scores for Audi are 7.48, 8.01 and 7.92. For Volkswagen, these average 
scores are 7.01, 7.77 and 7.48. The average scores for Skoda are 5.28, 4.77 and 6.05. Pair wise t-tests 
reveal significant differences (p <0.05) between Audi and Volkswagen, Audi and Skoda, and Volkswagen 
and Skoda on all these variables. We also asked these respondents to classify the brands in the luxury 
segment, the volume segment and the economy segment. In line with our classification 84% considered 
Audi as a luxury brand, 60% considered Volkswagen as a volume brand and 74% considered Skoda as an 
economy brand. Thus, these brands can indeed be considered as luxury, volume and economy brands. 
These 50 consumers also evaluated Toyota and Suzuki. The average scores on perceived price level, 
perceived prestige level and perceived quality on a 10-point scale for Lexus are 7.35, 7.48, and 7.40, for 
Toyota are 6.91, 7.14 and 7.78 and for Suzuki are 5.46, 5.67, and 6.36. These results show that based on 
price, and prestige level Lexus can be considered as prestige brand, Toyota as volume brand, while 
Suzuki can be considered as an economy brand. Note the very high quality score for Toyota, which 
reflects its reputation as the most reliable brand in the Dutch market. 76.9% of respondents classified 
Lexus as a prestige brand, 72% classified Toyota as volume brand, while 75% classified Suzuki as 
economy brand. Overall, these results support our classification of the considered brands. 
We also aim to select components that vary in terms of importance and visibility, drawing upon 
various sources: statements in prior literature on component sharing practices in this industry (Fisher et al. 
1999) and desk research by a research assistant. The selected 8 components are engine, brakes, wipers, 
platform/chassis, design, interior, shock absorbers, and wheels, as shown in table 1. 114 Dutch consumers 
master students evaluated the importance (1= not important, 7 = very important) and the visibility of the 
components (1=not visible, 7=very visible). Table A.1 shows substantial variation in the importance and 
visibility of these components, in line with our framework in table 1.  
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Table A.1: 
Average importance and visibility of selected components 
Component Average Importance Average Visibility 
Design 5.87 6.41 
Engine 5.89 4.57 
Brakes 5.64 3.71 
Interior 5.56 6.19 
Shock Absorber 4.97 3.30 
Platform/Chassis 4.50 3.48 
Wheels 4.33 5.10 
Wipers 3.66 4.31 
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Appendix A.2 
Experiment material: picture and information on the three brands 
A: Audi/Volkswagen/Skoda 
Audi A4: Important characteristics of this car are: 
2.0 l motor, 100 KW 
5 gears 
Power steering 
Air conditioning 
Price: 33.000 Euro 
 
 
 
 
Volkswagen Passat: Important characteristics of this car are: 
2.0 l motor, 100 KW 
5 gears 
Power steering 
Air conditioning 
Price: 29.500 Euro 
 
 
 
 
Skoda SuperB: Important characteristics of this car are:    
2.0 l motor, 100 KW 
5 gears 
Power steering 
Air conditioning 
Price: 26.000 Euro 
  
 
 
B: Lexus/Toyota/Suzuki 
 
Lexus IS 2000 Sport Business: Important characteristics of this car are: 
2.0 l motor, 100 KW 
5 gears 
Power steering 
Air conditioning 
Price: 34.000 Euro 
 
 
 
Toyota Corolla Verso: Important characteristics of this car are: 
1.6 l. Motor, 75 KW 
5 gears 
Power steering 
Air conditioning 
Pice: 26.000 Euro 
 
 
Suzuki Lilian: Important characteristics of this car are:    
1.6 l. Motor, 75 KW 
5 gears 
Power steering 
Air conditioning 
Priice: 17.000 Euro 
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Table 1: 
Component Importance and Visibility 
 
 More Important Less Important 
 
More Visible Interior  
Design 
 
Wheels 
Wipers 
 
Less Visible Engine 
Brakes5 
Platform/Chassis 
Shock Absorbers 
 
                                                 
5 While Fisher et al. (1999) note industry belief that brakes are less important, our respondents in a pre-test (n=118) 
indicated brakes are important, consistent with Business Week (2004). 
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Table 2: 
Initial Average Evaluations (standard deviations) for Brands 
 
 Evaluation Price (in Euros) Intentions 
Audi 73.3 (13.1) 26,776 (9,353) 4.42 (2.6) 
VW 68.4 (13.4) 24,356 (6,718) 4.35 (2.5) 
Skoda 61.6 (16.7)  19,582 (7,953) 4.0 (2.2) 
Lexus 66.1 (20.1) 25,609 (7,975) 3.6 (2.4) 
Toyota 59.74 (18.0) 20,343 (4,392) 3.8 (2.5) 
Suzuki 54.9 (17.3)  15,186 (6,230)  2.8 (2.1) 
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Table 3: 
Source Component Scenarios 
General Introduction In the car-industry it may occur, that car manufacturers use the same 
components in different brands. This occurs mainly when manufacturers 
offer multiple brands. For instance, Brand A may have the same brakes as 
Brand B. 
High-end to low-end The manufacturer has decided to use component (name) in the low-end 
(name) brand that is also used in the high-end (name) brand 
High-end & Low-end The manufacturer has decided that the component (name) in both the high-
end (name) and low-end brand is equal. 
Low-end to High-end The manufacturer has decided to use component (name) in the high-end 
(name) brand that is also used in the low-end (name) brand. 
 
Table 4: 
Descriptive Statistics on Experimental Conditions (N=1160)  
Brand Positioning 
Combination 
Higher-
End 
Brand 
Lower 
End-
Brand 
Source Format (Framing) of 
Component Sharing 
Higher-
End 
Brand 
Lower 
End-
Brand 
Luxury – Volume 
(standard deviation) 
-4.93 
(13.63) 
0.18 
(11.45) 
Higher-End to Lower-End -4.55 
(12.67) 
0.07 
(12.12) 
Volume– Economy -7.28 
(16.38) 
4.66 
(16.99) 
Higher-End & Lower-End 
 
-6.78 
(19.75) 
2.91 
(16.74) 
   Lower-End to Higher-End -7.39 
(13.03) 
4.94 
(15.44) 
p-value 0.01 0.00  0.02 0.00 
Shared Component 
Higher-
End 
Brand 
Lower 
End-
Brand 
Shared  
Component 
Higher-
End 
Brand 
Lower 
End-
Brand 
Engine -6.17 
(14.70) 
3.17 
(14.81) 
Design -4.91 
(13.91) 
2.44 
(14.82) 
Wiper -5.40 
(15.21) 
2.33 
(14.80) 
Wheels -7.11 
(16.42) 
2.36 
(15.11) 
Interior -7.45 
(16.36) 
2.63 
(15.02) 
Chassis/platform -6.69 
(15.24) 
2.52 
(14.76) 
Brakes -5.99 
(14.87) 
2.64 
(15.02) 
Shock Absorbers -5.82 
(15.01) 
2.96 
(14.51) 
p-value 0.86 1.00    
Brand Set      
Audi-Volkswagen-
Skoda 
-4.82 
(13.04) 
1.97 
(13.76) 
   
Lexus-Toyota-
Suzuki 
-7.37 
(16.77) 
3.16 
(15.76) 
   
p-value 0.01 0.18    
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Table 5: 
Estimation Results for First-Stage: Equations (3) and (4) (N=1160) 
Variables ∆EVA HE ∆EVA LE 
LUXVOL 
(standard deviation) 
-0.76** 
(0.31) 
-1.39** 
(0.23) 
HILOW 1.25** 
(0.38) 
-3.39** 
(0.29) 
LOWHI -2.10** 
(0.38) 
1.63** 
(0.29) 
BS 2.95** 
(0.32) 
-1.33** 
(0.23) 
ENGINE -0.77 
(0.55) 
0.84* 
(0.43) 
INTERIOR -2.06** 
(0.61) 
0.07 
(0.41) 
BRAKES -0.59 
(0.61) 
0.31 
(0.44) 
DESIGN 0.49 
(0.57) 
0.11 
(0.39) 
WHEELS -1.72* 
(0.63) 
0.03 
(0.44) 
SHOCK ABSORBERS -0.42 
(0.61) 
0.19 
(0.46) 
CHASSIS -1.28* 
(0.59) 
0.19 
(0.44) 
EVAhe - 0.51** 
(0.01) 
0.46** 
(0.01) 
EVAle 0.44** 
(0.01) 
-0.47** 
(0.01) 
AGE -0.11** 
(0.02) 
-0.17** 
(0.02) 
SEX 0.97** 
(0.37) 
0.45 
(0.26) 
EDUC 1.89** 
(0.24) 
1.00** 
(0.29) 
INCOME -2.97** 
(0.42) 
1.03** 
(0.29) 
EXPERIENCE 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.15** 
(0.01) 
OWNLUX -7.56** 
(0.85) 
-8.07** 
(0.60) 
OWNVOL -8.56** 
(0.46) 
3.24** 
(0.33) 
OWNECON 8.74** 
(0.98) 
2.68** 
(0.74) 
CONSTANT 8.65** 
(1.80) 
-0.83 
(1.16) 
S.D. CONSTANT 9.34** 
(0.14) 
10.33** 
(0.10) 
Loglikelihood RE -4098.61 -4542.76 
Loglikelihood OLS -4469.68 -3786.33 
p-value Likelihood-ratio (RE-OLS) test  0.00 0.00 
 
  27
Table 6: 
Effects of Evaluation on Purchase Intent and Willingness-to-Pay (equation 5) 
 
AUDI  VOLKSWAGEN  SKODA  
INTENTIONS Coefficient INTENTIONS Coefficient INTENTIONS Coefficient 
CONSTANT -0.54 CONSTANT -0.66 CONSTANT -3.55 
EVAL 0.07** EVA 0.10** EVA 0.09** 
EXPER -0.06* AGE -0.04* INCOME 0.76 
  OWNVOL 1.42*   
R2 0.22 R2 0.34 R2 0.42 
PRICE Coefficient PRICE Coefficient PRICE Coefficient 
CONSTANT 15205 CONSTANT 1526.35 CONSTANT 3573.41 
EVAL 137.00 EVA 214.26** EVA 254.24** 
EDUC 2668.40 INCOME 2963.90* INCOME 11411.62* 
AGE -167.68     
ONWLUX -10771     
OWNECON 7397.58     
R2 0.17 R2 0.21 R2 0.39 
LEXUS  TOYOTA  SUZUKI  
INTENTIONS Coefficient INTENTIONS Coefficient INTENTIONS Coefficient 
CONSTANT -1.23 CONSTANT 0.00 CONSTANT -1.48 
EVAL 0.05** EVA 0.06** EVA 0.05** 
EDUC 0.52   EDUC 0.43 
R2 0.19 R2 0.30 R2 0.21 
PRICE Coefficient PRICE Coefficient PRICE Coefficient 
CONSTANT 8016.23 CONSTANT 12412.08** CONSTANT 166623.23 
EVAL 108.51** EVA 50.98* EVA 50.71 
EXPER -192.22** AGE 119.53** INCOME -227.31** 
INCOME 5184.07* OWNVOL -2164.85** EXPER 3648.98* 
R2 0.24 R2 0.14 R2 0.21 
Notes: 
* p<0.05; **p<0.01 
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Table 7: 
Revenue impact (in Euros) of component sharing strategies without specifying component source 
 Audi-VW VW-Skoda Lexus-Toyota Toyota-Suzuki 
Interior - 29, 506 K - 42, 873 K - 111 K - 22, 203 K 
Engine - 19, 500 K - 29, 945 K 3, 243 K - 15, 960 K 
Platform - 26, 700 K - 35, 498 K 468 K - 18, 875 K 
Wipers - 25, 698 K - 23, 831 K - 198 K - 13, 886 K 
Average -29, 351 K -33,037 K 851 K -17,731 K 
 
Table 8: 
Revenue impact (in Euros) of component sharing strategies from higher-end to lower-end brand 
 Audi-VW VW-Skoda Lexus-Toyota Toyota-Suzuki 
Interior - 58, 328 K - 35, 480 K - 14, 061 K - 21, 413 K 
Engine - 48, 394 K - 22, 513 K - 10, 753 K - 15, 159 K 
Platform - 55, 523 K - 28, 072 K - 13, 488 K - 18, 071 K 
Wipers - 54, 474 K - 16, 343 K - 14,142 K - 13, 048 K 
Average -54,180 K -25,602 K -10,490 K - 16,923 K 
 
Table 9: 
Revenue impact (in Euros) of component sharing strategies from lower-end to higher-end brand 
 Audi-VW VW-Skoda Lexus-Toyota Toyota-Suzuki 
Interior - 18, 687 K - 60, 174 K 6, 523 K - 28, 597 K 
Engine - 8, 675 K - 46, 111 K 9, 898 K - 22, 393 K 
Platform - 15, 898 K - 52, 858 K - 506 K - 18, 777 K 
Wipers - 14, 946 K - 41, 290 K 6, 431 K - 20, 359 K 
Average 11,641 K -50,108 K 5,587 K -22,532 K 
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 Figure 1: 
Model Framework for Assessing Revenues Impact of Component Sharing Strategies 
 
Brand Combination
-Luxury – Volume
-Volume – Economy
Source of Component
-high to low
-high & low
-low to high
Component Shared
Change in 
Evaluation
Higher-End Brand
Change in 
Evaluation
Lower-End Brand
Revenue ($) 
Implications
Firm
Sharing strategy Brand Evaluation Purchase behavior Revenue
Purchase Intentions
Higher-End Brand
Price Willing to Pay 
Higher-End Brand
Purchase Intentions
Lower-End Brand
Price Willing to Pay 
Lower-End Brand
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